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Separate but not Equal: The 
Supreme Court's First Decision on 
Racial Discrimination in Schools 
By J. MoRGAN KoussER 
IN 1899, THREE YEARS AFTER THE "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" DECI-
sion of P/essy v. Ferguson, the U. S. Supreme Court for the first 
time confronted the problem of racial discrimination in education. 
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice John Marshall Harlan, 
whose recently refurbished reputation rests chiefly on his liberal 
opinions in Negro rights cases, decided in effect that the judiciary 
would do no more to guarantee equality in public services than it 
had to stop legalized segregation. " ... the education of the people 
in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter belonging to the 
respective States," the justice, who was rarely a protector of states' 
rights, concluded, "and any interference on the part of Federal 
authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified 
except in the case of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights 
secured by the supreme law of the land. We have here no such case 
to be determined ...• " 1 Attracting even less attention at the time 
than Plessy did, the case of Joseph W. Cumming, James S. Harper, 
and John C. Ladeveze v. School Board of Richmond County, Ga. 
has never received the attention Plessy gained in the wake of the 
outlawing of segregation in the 1954 Brown decision.' The leading 
' 175 U.S. 528, 545. On Harlan's reputation and the reasons for changes in it see G. 
Edward White, The American Judicial Tradition: Profiles of Leading American Judges 
(New York, 1976), 129. Research for this paper was partially supported by the Arnold L. and 
Lois S. Graves Award and by research funds from the Division of Humanities and Social 
Sciences at California Institute of Technology. I owe a great deal of thanks to several people 
who provided me with information and leads to further information: Professor Edward J. 
Cashin of Augusta College, Mr. Joseph B. Cumming, Mrs. Virginia de Treville of the 
Augusta College Library, and especially Mrs. Mary Harper Ingram; and to colleagues who 
were kind enough to comment on an earlier version of the paper, Robert F. Engs, Clayton R. 
Koppes, and Stanley N. Kutler. 
• According to Raymond P. Stone Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) "went virtually 
unnoticed" in newspapers and legal journals at the time, attracting less attention in most of 
the newspapers which regularly covered the Court's decisions than an obscure civil case 
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case on educational discrimination for four decades, Cumming has 
neither been specifically overruled by judges nor subjected to more 
than passing mention by legal scholars or historians. 5 A thorough 
analysis of the Cumming case will cast new light on the nature of 
race relations, racial politics, and the character of the black elite in 
the postbellum South; rais.e serious questions about Justice 
. 1 Harlan's devotion to civil rights;~ contribute to the growing ten-~~~ ¥,.-4! ~~" '-'~en.fY to substitute a broader social history for the narrow study of 
1;~~ -b abstract legalistic oriQctples which hM u.ntilJ:.ecently_cJ?JlSt!!!!~ 
~ ..... ,~~.a.-nc.... !futon: oila~.:.! 
. De.~~ ~ Four factors shaped the course of black education in Augusta and ;;tt. ~(~ the surrounding county of Richmond in the late nineteenth century: 
· ~.,~~ ~ the black masses' strong desire for education, black political power, 
~\-c*ee~tthe activities of the black elite, and the attitudes of white leaders. 
Denied an education, at least in law, before 1865, the former slaves 
and free people of color developed "an almost limitless faith in the 
possibilities of advancement through schooling."5 As early as June 
1866 the blacks' push to learn led the local Inferior Court, which 
served at the time as Augusta's school board, to hold a public meet-
ing to offer local financial support for a few schools for Negroes 
until the legislature could set up a formal state-funded system. At 
decided the same day. The New York Times briefly summarized Plessy in a column headlined 
"Railway News," and the Washington Post, noting that carpetbagger-lawyer-novelist Al-
bion Winegar Tourgc!e had represented Plessy, curtly dismissed the case as "another fool's 
errand," a reference to Tourgee's most famous novel. See Stone," 'Separate But Equal': 
The Evolution and Demise of a Constitutional Doctrine" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Princeton University, 1964), 263-64. There are brief newspaper reports on Cumming in 
Washington Post, December 19, 1899, p. 5; Oeveland Gazette, December 30, 1899; Phila-
delphia Public Ledger, December 19, 1899, p. 12; and, of course, longer treatments in the 
Georgia newspapers. The best of the numberless treatments of Plessy are C. Vann 
Woodward, American Counterpoint: Slavery and Racism in the North-South Dialogue (Bos-
ton and Toronto, 1971), 212-33; and Otto H. Olsen, ed., The Thin Disguise: Turning Point 
in Negro History, Plessy v. Ferguson .. _(New York, 1967). See pp. 25-27, 123-30, of 
Olsen's book for another treatment of the response to Plessy. 
• The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and the 
Court majority tiptoed around Cumming, much to the dissenters' disgust, in Missouri ex. rei. 
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 340, 353 (1938), and lawyers for both sides in Brown 
handled the by then doddering Cumming precedent gingerly. See Leon Friedman, ed., Argu-
ment: The Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education ... 
(New York, 1969), 42n, 57, 231: Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 491 (1954). 
Most of the treatments of the case devote only one or two paragraphs to it. For specific 
citations see below, notes 47-48, 53-56. 
• For a variety of attempts to escape the coils of narrow constitutional doctrine as the 
exclusive focus of legal history see Wythe Holt, ed., Essays in 19th Century American Legal 
History (Westport, Conn., 1976); and Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (New York, 1975). 
'John M. Matthews, "Studies in Race Relations in Georgia, 1890-1930," (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University, 1970), 9. The 1829law making it illegal to teach any 
black to read or write seems to have been widely ignored. See Edward F. Sweat, "The Free 
Negro in Ante-Bellum Georgia" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1957), 
205-207. 
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the urging of spokesman Robert Augustus Harper, the blacks at the 
meeting agreed to accept the court's proposal as a gesture of good 
faith .• Though it is unclear from surviving records whether the 
whites followed through completely on their promise, the fact that 
they gave it does indicate a desire on their part to conciliate the 
blacks or at least to keep control of the Negroes' education in the 
hands of the southern whites. 6 But since the 1866 Johnsonian legis-
lature confined fiscal support to white schools and the turbulence of 
Congressional Reconstruction in Georgia prevented the establish-
ment of a stable state educational system, schooling for Augusta 
blacks in the 1860s and early 1870s depended entirely on the efforts 
of the local community, the Freedmen's Bureau, and northern mis-
sionary societies. 7 Only after the Democrats regained control of 
Georgia in 1871 and 1872 was the biracial public school system put 
on a firm footing in Richmond County. 
Black political power left its impress on the state legislature's 
1872 passage of a bill, drawn up by a local committee of nineteen 
whites, which establish'ed a countywide system of education in 
Richmond County and granted its school board extraordinary 
powers. 8 Section 9 of the bill, though mandating segregation, spe-
cifically provided that the Richmond County School Board ''shall 
provide the same facilities for both [white and Negro children], 
both as regards schoolhouses and fixtures, attainments and abilities 
of teachers, length of term time, and all other matters appertaining 
to education .... " Unlike most other school boards in Georgia, 
the Richmond County board could establish high schools (Section 
1 0) and levy local taxes without a referendum, and no general law on 
education could supersede the 1872 special act. Furthermore, Rich-
mond County was expressly excused from the 1877 state 
constitution's prohibition on public high schools. 9 
Their rights guaranteed in law, black leaders pressed for full im-
• Augusta Chronicle, July I, 1866. The Augusta Daily Press, May 3, June 21, 1866, quoted 
in Alan Conway, The Reconstruction of Georgia (Minneapolis, 1966), 86, favored setting up 
schools for blacks by southern whites to preempt northerners from control. 
' On the bureau schools see Conway, Reconstruction, 84-96. The local school board did 
partially subsidize the salaries of bureau teachers in Augusta. See Jacqueline Jones, "The 
'Great Opportunity': Northern Teachers and the Georgia Freedman, 1865-1873" (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1976), 403. 
• The fact that it was drafted locally implies that the law reflected the opinion of the 
Augusta white elite, at least, and not simply that of a legislative committee. On the writing of 
the bill see Augusta Chronicle, May 21, 24, 1872. For the act see Public Law 456, Georgia, 
Public Laws Passed by the General Assembly . .. 1872 (Atlanta, 1872). 
• See Article VIII, Section V, Paragraph I, ofthe 1877 constitution, Francis N. Thorpe, 
comp., The Federal and State Constitutions • .. (7 vols., Washington D. C., 1909), II, 868. 
The board was allowed, if it wished, to charge tuition in high schools by Section 10, Public 
Law 347 of 1877. 
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plementation by the board. Pointing out that the buildings allo-
cated to blacks could not accommodate all those who sought admis-
sion during the 1872-1873 term, former Freedmen's Bureau agent 
William Jefferson White offered the Richmond County School 
Board three ~uildings which had been owned by the bureau and two 
rooms in the black Harmony Baptist Church, of which he was pas-
tor .10 Stressing both student demand and the need to train teachers 
for the elementary schools, White also petitioned for a black public 
high school. In response, the city's leading newspaper noted the 
provisions of the law and endorsed White's request as "just and 
fair.'' ''If the whites have high schools, grammar, intermediate and 
primary schools," the Chronicle's editorial continued, "let the col-
ored children have them also. Let no children, white or colored, be 
turned away for want of teachers, or school room, or books, whose 
parents or guardians are desirous that they should receive an educa-
tion. Give both races exactly the same opportunities and equal ad-
vantages."11 
Described by the Negro Atlanta Age as "the father of [Negro] 
education" in Georgia, White had started Augusta Baptist Insti-
tute, which later became Morehouse College, in 1867. Originally 
devoted to upgrading the meager educational attainments of black 
Baptist ministers, the institute seems to have functioned primarily 
as a high school for the black community during the 1870s. When its 
trustees decided in 1879 that a move to Atlanta would put the school 
on a firmer financial footing, the long-delayed issue of a public high 
school for blacks came to a head. 12 
Richmond County in 1880 supported one semipublic and two 
public high schools for whites and from time to time had partially 
subsidized the venerable Academy of Richmond County for boys. 15 
It was, therefore, obvious to county school commissioner William 
Henry Fleming that the 1872law required the school board to take 
•• Augusta Chronicle, April 13, 1873. 
11 Ibid., July 22, 1873. 
11 Atlanta Age, quoted in Savannah Tribune, April 30, 1898; John A. Dittmer, "The 
Black Man and White Supremacy in Georgia During the Progressive Era" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1971), 183; Mrs. Mary Blocker (daughter of William 
J. White) to Laura Harper, AprilS, 1962, in a collection of papers now in possession of Mrs. 
Mary Harper Ingram of Atlanta, which will be referred to hereinafter as Harper Family 
Papers; Ridgely Torrence, The Story of John Hope (New York, 1948), 122; Willard Range, 
The Rise and Progress of Negro Colleges in Georgia, 1865-/949 (Athens, Ga, 1951), 8, 16, 
24-26, 53, 108; Benjamin G. Brawley, History of Morehouse College (Atlanta, Ga., 1917), 
12-27. 
11 The mix of public and private funding and the charging of tuition in "public" high 
schools was quite typical of the pragmatic, unbureaucratized school systems of the South 
during this period. See John L. Maxwell, Pleasant A. Stovall, and T. R. Gibson, The Hand-
book of Augusta(Augusta, 1878), 63-66; Augusta Chronicle, June 18-21, September 18-20, 
1895; February 12, 1900. 
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positive action on a July 1880 petition requesting a black public high 
school. Appointed at a mass meeting of the black population, the 
committee of five leading Negroes, which included William J. 
White, Robert Harper's son James S. Harper, and Colored Metho-
dist bishop Lucius Henry Holsey, "respectfully but earnestly" 
called for compliance with the law. In response, Fleming, an out-
spoken racial moderate whose views did not prevent his later elec-
tion as speaker of the state House of Representatives and as con-
gressman from Augusta, reminded the board of Section 9 of the 
1872law and reiterated his previous recommendation in favor of a 
black high school. "To grant to-day the petition of the colored 
people," Fleming announced, "would be only an act of tardy jus-
tice."H 
Asserting that the law compelled the establishment of a black 
high school eventually but not immediately, the lawyer for the 
board and chairman of its high school committee, Joseph Ganahl, 
moved successfully to "CJ,ccept" rather than "adopt" Fleming's re-
port, and it appeared that the board would bury the blacks' petition 
in committee. Between the July and October board meetings, how-
ever, the issue of black schools agitated both state and national 
elections. Reminding his audience at a political rally that black as 
well as white taxes supported the white high schools, 1880 Republi-
can national convention delegate and former state legislator Edwin 
Belcher condemned the board: "The school law says equal facilities 
shall be given white and colored children. Now the white children 
have a high school and the colored have none .... That will not 
do." 15 The Eighth Congressional District Republican Convention, 
moreover, heard William J. White's denunciation of "the dis-
crimination against colored children and colored teachers in many 
of the counties of the State." And in the hotly contested guberna-
tional race between Alfred Holt Colquitt and Thomas Manson Nor-
wood, the young Thomas Edward "Tom" Watson claimed in an 
14 On the black petition and meeting see "Minutes of the Richmond County School Board, 
1876-1891," 132-33, bound manuscript, in the school board offices, Augusta, hereinafter 
referred to as "Minutes." On Fleming see Edward L. Cashin, "Thomas E. Watson and the 
Catholic Laymen's Association of Georgia" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fordham 
University,l962), 13,59-61, 91-92; Augusta Chronicle, July 11,1880(quotation); May 13, 
June 5, 6, 1902; June 20, 22, 1906; Fleming, Slavery and the Race Problem in the South 
(Boston, [1906)). For further information and more complete citations of sources of infor-
mation on Fleming and other Augustans treated in this paper, see my "Separate but Not 
Equal: The Supreme Court's First Decision on Discrimination in Schools," unpublished 
California Institute of Technology Working Paper, No. 204 (March 1978). 
11 On the board meeting see Augusta Chronicle, July II, October 10, 1880; Ganahl's 
motion is in "Minutes" (1876-91), 126-27. Belcher's speech is in Augusta Chronicle, July 
28, 1880. On Belcher, a light-skinned Negro who was a forceful proponent of black political 
power, see Edward E. Young, "The Negro in Georgia Politics, 1867-1877" (unpublished 
M.A. thesis, Emory University, 1955), 35; Olive H. Shadgett, The Republican Party in 
Georgia from Reconstruction Through 1900 (Athens, Ga., 1964), 78-79. 
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Augusta speech that blacks should support Norwood because he 
would give them ''a fair share in education.'' Because there was no 
registration law and the poll-tax prerequisite was seldom strictly 
enforced (an 1881 grand jury investigation showed that only 30 per-
cent of the voters in the 1880 municipal election had paid their 
taxes), the blacks voted freely in local as well as state and national 
elections, and, according to the Chronicle, "their votes were sought 
by all the candidates,'' Democrats as well as Republicans. Perhaps 
responding to the pressure of the black electorate, the school board 
at its October 1880 meeting voted to establish a black high school, 
overriding the objection of one board member that the shortage of 
places in black primary schools should be alleviated before allocat-
ing money to the higher branches. 16 
The black community demonstrated its control over its own 
schools immediately, as William J. White was allowed to recruit 
perhaps the best-qualified black teacher in the state as the high 
school's principal-teacher. Born a slave in 1855, the new principal, 
Atlanta University graduate Richard Robert Wright, quickly gained 
the respect of the local black leadership as well as the white school 
board .17 As if to underline the independence of the high school from 
southern white control, Wright named it for his mentor, the Massa-
chusetts-born white carpetbagger and Freedmen's Bureau officer 
who founded and served as president of the then highly controver-
sial Atlanta University, Edmund Asa Ware. 18 
Ware High, which offered the same classical curriculum as the 
white schools, quickly became a "complete success" in the words of 
1881 county school commissioner Benjamin Neely. It was the only 
public high school for Negroes in Georgia before 19t5 and one of 
perhaps four in the eleven ex-Confederate states in 1880. Providing 
11 The quotations are taken, respectively, from the Augusta Chronicle, September 2, Octo-
ber 2, and July 22, 1880. The grand jury investigation was reported in Augusta Chronicle, 
October 30, 1881. Supported by other state black leaders, Colquitt carried the black vote in 
Augusta, 780 to 133. Augusta Chronicle, October 7, 1880. On black participation in Augusta 
politics during this period see William B. Hamilton, "Political Control in a Southern City: 
Augusta, Georgia, in the 1890s" (unpublished A.B. thesis, Harvard University, 1972), 
34-54; Richard H. L. German, "The Queen City of the Savannah: Augusta, Georgia, 
During the Urban Progressive Era, 1890-1917" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University 
:>f Florida, 1971), 46, 152. Until about 1900 black votes bought lenient enforcement of the 
law for Augusta Negroes according to A. G. Coombs and L. D. Davis, "Crime in Augusta," 
in W. E. Burghardt Du Bois, ed., Some Notes on Negro Crime, Particularly in Georgia 
:Atlanta, Ga., 1904), 52-53. 
" Elizabeth R. Haynes, The Black Boy of Atlanta (Boston, 1952), 99-101, 120, and pas-
sim; and Clarence A. Bacote, "The Negro in Georgia Politics, 1880-1908" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1955), 52-53, 236; Shadgett, Republican Party, 
84-85; Augusta Chronicle, April 16, 1881; June 9, July 2, 8, 1897. 
•• On Ware see National Cyclopedia of American Biography, V (New York, 1907), 380. 
On integrationist Atlanta University see Range, Rise and Progress of Negro Colleges, 60-63. 
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comparatively well-trained teachers for Richmond and the sur-
rounding counties, the school served as well as a source of pride and 
an avenue of mobility for Augusta's energetic, striving black com-
munity .19 Although sectarian pride and the insatiable black demand 
for education led the Baptists, Methodists, and Presbyterians to 
open separate black high schools in Augusta over the next dozen 
years (at least one of which unsuccessfully petitioned for a subsidy 
from the school board) Ware remained, according to the Chronicle, 
"the leading high school among the colored people of this state. " 20 
Ware High served political as well as educational purposes. 
Straining for every vote in his three congressional contests with the 
Populist Tom Watson, Democrat James Conquest Cross Black ap-
pealed for Negro votes in Augusta on the ground that in Richmond 
County, "the colored girls and colored boys are educated at the 
expense of the whites and given the benefits not only of a common 
school, but a high school education." The $800 yearly net expense 
of Ware High was, so loHg as Negroes voted, a good investment for 
the Democrats. In response to Black, Watson claimed that Negroes 
paid approximately as much through direct and indirect taxes as 
they received for schools. The Populists, Watson asserted, would 
allocate to Negroes their "share of the public school fund" on 
grounds of simple justice, without the Democrats' "misleading" 
and specious pretensions to paternalism.21 
In fact, the Democratic claims were exaggerated, for Augusta's 
black schools were by no means equal to those for whites. Housed in 
11 
"Minutes" (1876-91), 153, for Neely's statement; 13th Annual Report of the Public 
Schools of Richmond County, 1885 (Augusta, 1886), 15-16; German, "Queen City," 
36-37; Matthews, "Race Relations in Georgia," 300, for facts on Ware and other schools in 
Georgia. House Executive Documents, 47 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 1: Report of the Secretary of 
the lnterior(4 vols., Serials 2017-20, Washington, 1881-1883), IV, 4-307, gives statistics of 
secondary schools. On the place of Ware and other public schools in the life of the Augusta 
black community see Augusta Chronicle, July 2, 22, August 31, September 24, 1880; June 
10, 24, July 17, August 5, September 16, December 31, 1894; March 3, 12, Aprill3, 14, June 
14, August 18, 1895; August 25, October 14, 22, 1897; September 29, 1898; January 11, 13, 
November 16, 29, December 24, 1899; February 11, 18, March 7, 1900; Washington Bee, 
April 30, 1898; Savannah Tribune, April 23, 1898; Augusta Union, January 27, 1900; 
Haynes, Black Boy of Atlanta, 99-112; J. L. Nichols and William H. Crogman, Progress of 
a Race, or the Remarkable Advancement of the American Negro (Napierville, Ill., 1929), 
373; German, "Queen City," 135-37. For the changing attitude of School Superintendent 
Lawton Bryan Evans toward the propriety of providing public high school education for 
blacks, compare pp. 309-11 with p. 403 of "Minutes" (1876-91). 
•• Matthews, "Race Relations in Georgia," 297-98; George E. Clary, Jr., "The Founding 
of Paine College-A Unique Venture in Interracial Cooperation in the New South, 
1882-1903" (unpublished Ed.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1965), 24. The quota-
tion is from the Augusta Chronicle, June 9, 1897. 
u Both quotations are from the Atlanta People's Party Paper, November 2, 1894; for a 
similar appeal by Black in 1895 see Augusta Chronicle, September 26, 1895. Naturally, Black 
also sought Negro votes on the more conventional grounds of patronage and of putting 
Negroes on juries. 
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the 1880s in four "disreputable structures" which had been used for 
hospitals during the Civil War, the black schools, despite some up-
grading during the 1890s, could not hold all the children who wished 
to attend. In 1897 the board owned or rented forty-one schools with 
an average value of $4,622 for whites, but only twenty-two worth 
about $1,100 each for blacks. As Commissioner Lawton Bryan 
Evans noted repeatedly in his annual reports, the primary schools 
each year had to turn away three hundred to a thousand Negro 
children for lack of seats, and more probably would have attempted 
to register if the board had overridden efforts, led by Joseph 
Ganahl, to keep tax rates low. 21 Enrollment figures support Evans's 
statements. Although the percentage of Richmond County's six-to-
eighteen-year-old blacks enrolled rose from 18 percent in 1881 to 34 
percent in 1897, the whites retained a comfortable lead, enrolling 47 
percent in 1881 and 59 percent in 1897. Moreover, black children, 
who composed a slight majority of Richmond's school-age popula-
tion, hadhalfasmanyteachersasthewhites: in 1881 therewere212 
blacks age six to eighteen for every black teacher, and only 97 
whites; in 1897, 151 and 76; in 1900, 171 and 71; and in 1910, 173 
and 66. And the black teachers were less well paid. In 1877 the white 
teachers received an average of$40 per month to the blacks' $25; in 
1888 the range for whites was $35 to $50 a month, while the blacks 
got $20 to $40; in 1897 the whites averaged $43 compared to $30 for 
the Negroes; and in 1907 the figures were $50 and $25, respec-
tively.25 
When the fragmentary figures on the salaries paid to the teachers 
of each race are divided by the numbers of each race within the 
school ages, the degree of discrimination becomes clearer. As Table 
1 shows, Richmond County spent three or four times as much on 
•• Ware High in 1895 was taught in a building described by the Chronicle of June 9 as "a 
relic of past days." The quotation in the text is from Helen Chapman, "The Contributions to 
Education of Lawton B. Evans" (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, 1949), 20. 
See also Augusta Chronicle, June 17, September 15, 18, October 14, 1894; January 20, 
September 22, 1895; Evans, Thirteenth Annual Report of the Public Schools of Richmond 
County, 1885 (Augusta, 1886), 16; and Evans, Fifteenth Annual Report of the Public 
Schools of Richmond County, J887(Augusta, 1888). In addition, see "Minutes" (1876-91), 
235-36, 384; and "Minutes" (1900), 53-57. 
11 The statistics for teachers' salaries for 1897 are incomplete, since the totals for salaries in 
the printed state report for 1897 do not match those computed by adding up the average 
salaries multiplied by the number of teachers of each "grade" by race. Apparently, the 
salaries of principals (who also taught) were left out of the average salary figures, for their 
salaries were high enough to have raised the averages above the stated 1897 figures. Since the 
racial differential in the principals' salaries was higher than that for other teachers, exclusion 
of them reduces the measured racial disparity for 1897. It also understates the level of support 
per student for white schools in 1897 by perhaps $1 to $1.50. Figures for Table 1 come from 
the published reports of the Augusta school board, as well as the unpublished "Minutes" for 
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TABLE 1 
EXPENDITURES ON TEACHERS' SALARIES PER 
SCHOOL-AGE CHILD, RICHMOND COUNTY, GEORGIA 
25 
Ratio of White 
White Black to Black 
$6.48 $1.66 3.90 
6.69 1.46 4.58 
5.14 1.80 2.86 
6.34 2.04 3.11 
6.30 1.84 3.42 
6.89 1.61 4.28 
7.72 1.69 4.57 
each white as each black pupil, and if the figures on expenses for 
buildings and maintenance were available by race, the measured 
degree of discrimination would no doubt rise. In 1907 and 1908, for 
instance, the board made no physical improvements on its black 
schools, but completed"two new white schools valued at $85,000 
and $100,000, respectively. Finally, despite giant strides in impart-
ing bare literacy to Augusta teenagers, discrimination in the outputs 
of the school system paralleled discrimination in service levels: in 
1894, 5 percent of the white and 13 percent of the black youths over 
ten in Richmond County could not read and write; in 1898 the fig-
ures were 4 percent and 12 percent; in 1908, 0.2 percent and 2 per-
cent.2• 
And though whites appear to have partially subsidized black 
schools in Augusta, James C. C. Black greatly exaggerated when he 
claimed that Negroes were educated "at the expense of the whites." 
Assuming that Negroes paid indirect taxes, which were levied 
chiefly on liquor, in proportion to their numbers, rather than their 
wealth, it is possible to compute the blacks' share of total taxes and 
fees. Column 1 of Table 2 gives the figures for the years around the 
turn of the century for which both tax and expenditure statistics are 
available. Column 2 of the table shows the proportion of teachers' 
salaries which went to Negroes, column 3 the resultant white "sub-
sidy" in dollars, and column 4 the increase in the tax rate, in mills, 
which whites in the county had to pay because of their subsidy to 
black schools. It cost the average white male adult in Richmond 
County, who owned $3,018.89 worth of property, only $1.42 per 
year to subsidize the black schools at the height of the subsidy in 
.. The reports on the cost of building the white schools come from the Georgia, Depart-
ment of Education, Thirty-sixth Annual Report (Atlanta, 1907), 382; and Thirty-seventh 
Annual Report (Atlanta, 1908), 482; other statistics from the printed annual reports of the 
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TABLE 2 
PROPORTION OF TAXES PAID, EXPENDITURES ON 
BLACKS IN RICHMOND COUNTY, AMOUNT OF WHITE 
SUBSIDY, AND INCREASE IN TAX RATE FOR WHITES 
DuE TO BLACK SuBSIDY 
Percent Change in 
Percent Taxes Expenditures on White White Tax Rate 
Paid by Blacks Blacks Subsidy (in mills) 
15.2 19.7 $ 3,351 0.15 
14.8 28.0 10,152 0.47 
10.9 24.2 10,668 0.47 
11.4 20.3 7,407 0.33 
1900, and if statistics for buildings and maintenance existed, even 
this subsidy would probably disappear. 
To show how the figures for column 1, Table 2, were calculated, 
1895 can be used as an example. The state appropriation to Rich-
mond County in that year was $31,880. This derived from indirect 
taxes, the lease on the state-owned railroad, and property taxes, 
amounting to $146,828, $210,006, and $600,000, respectively, at the 
state level. It was assumed that blacks were "due" income from the 
lease and indirect taxes in proportion to the percentage of black 
adult males to all adult males (proxies for households) in the state. 
Blacks made up about 44~ 7 percent of the adult males. Thus, the 
blacks in Richmond County were'' due'' 44.7 percent of that part of 
the state appropriation which was made up of indirect taxes (37 .3 
percent), or $5,315 from indirect taxes. 
Blacks owned 3.5 percent of the taxable property in Richmond 
County in 1895. Thus, they were "due" 3.5 percent of that part of 
the state appropriation which came from property taxes (62. 7 per-
cent) or $700. 
Poll taxes all went to schools in the county where they were col-
lected. Richmond County blacks paid $4,121 in poll taxes in 1895. 
After the institution of the white primary in 1898 and 1899 the num-
ber of blacks who paid their poll taxes dropped off drastically, 
which accounts for the decline in the percentages in column 1 from 
1897 to 1900 and 1901. 
Finally, blacks paid about 3.5 percent of the $45,000 local prop-
erty tax for schools, or $1,575. 
Thus, the total estimated taxes paid by blacks for schools was 
$11,711, or 15.2 percent of the $31,880 state and $45,000 local 
taxes. 
Black schools in 1895 actually received in salaries $12,955, which 
would make the subsidy $1 ,244, but, under the assumption that the 
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expenses for building and maintenance were distributed propor-
tionately to salaries-an assumption which no doubt overestimates 
the white subsidy-the total subsidy from whites amounted to 
$3,351. The relatively small funds which the school board received 
from private sources and tuition have been disregarded in these 
calculations because of insufficient evidence about their origins. 
In 1897 seventeen-year-old Ware High was thriving, having 
doubled the number of students and added an assistant teacher over 
its life span. Its principal since 1891,-Henry L. Walker, had or-
ganized the Negro State Teachers' Association and served as its 
president for a decade and was highly regarded by both the Augusta 
black community and the school board. Since Ware, like the white 
public high schools, charged tuition, the black high school's net cost 
to the board in 1897 came to only $842.50, which amounted to less 
than 1 percent of the board's total expenditures or approximately 5 
percent of the money spent on black schools. Yet on July 10, 1897, 
the board, pointing to the need for more black primary schools and 
claiming that the schools were financially hard pressed, voted to 
terminate Ware and use the $842.50 to hire four elementary teachers 
to teach fifty students for $25 a month. 25 Though the evidence is 
fragmentary, it appears likely that the initial impetus to end Ware 
came from Lucy Laney, the (black) principal of one of the compet-
ing private black high schools.26 
Announced without previous public discussion, the board's deci-
sion aroused a storm of protest in the black community. Within five 
days 155 Augusta blacks signed a petition, which cited the egalitar-
ian requirement of Section 9 of the 1872 Public Law 346 and quietly 
punctured the board's declaration of poverty by pointing out that 
the increase in funds for 1898 recently voted by the state legislature 
would allow the board easily to satisfy the needs for both primary 
and secondary schools for the blacks. 27 Considerably wealthier than 
the average Augusta Negro, the petitioners were mostly profes-
sionals or skilled craftsmen who, despite their economic depen-
dence on white customers or employers, were not afraid to assert 
their rights. 2s 
•• Augusta Chronicle, June 17, 1897; "Minutes" (1891-99), 370-72 . 
.. For evidence of Laney's role in this affair, which may have been motivated by a desire to 
expand black primary education or may simply represent an effort to kill off the chief com-
petitor of her private high school see the working-paper version of this paper, note 38 . 
., Since the legislature had increased its general school appropriation, Richmond County 
would receive 41 percent more from the state in 1898 than in 1897. Thus, the projected total 
1898 budget for Richmond County's schools would rise by $13,000 or approximately 23 
percent over the 1897 level. 
•• The multiplicity of often obscure sources for my information on individual Augustans 
prevents their extensive citation here. I instead refer interested scholars to my previously cited 
working paper, which I shall be happy to supply upon request. 
28 THE JOURNAL OF SOUTHERN H/STOR Y 
The chief organizers of the protest, who also directed and largely 
financed the subsequent court case, were first cousins whose fami-
lies' intertwined personal, business, and church relationships pre-
dated the Civil War. Virtually indistinguishable in surviving photo-
graphs from men classed as Caucasians, John C. Ladeveze and 
James S. Harper employed the wealth, education, and resultant 
social position which constituted the legacy of their white ancestors 
to become pillars of black society, and, in this case, to fight against 
racial discrimination. Grandsons of a white Frenchman who had 
lived openly with a mulatto woman in antebellum Augusta, Harper 
and Ladeveze were playmates in childhood and business associates 
as adults, as their fathers had been. Their lieutenants in the Ware 
movement, Joseph W. Cumming and William J. White were, like 
Harper and Ladeveze, very light-skinned, comparatively wealthy, 
and quite active in all aspects of the life of the black community. A 
Republican, Populist, and later Socialist, White was the single most 
influential figure in nineteenth-century black education in Augusta 
as well as editor or'the most important local black newspaper. Like 
Cumming, whose name seems to have been listed first in the even-
tual court case for purely alphabetic reasons, White had a Cauca-
sian father and appears, from his role in this and other black protest 
movements, to have been particularly sensitive to racial slights 
which came from men barely lighter in skin tone than himself. 
Although agreeing to meet in special session to consider the black 
petition, the school board on August 28, 1897, rejected the argu-
ments of the written document and oral presentations by Ladeveze 
and White and reaffirmed its decision by a vote of 23 to 3, with two 
abstentions. It is significant that all three of the school board's dis-
senters represented the Fifth Ward, a lower-class factory area which 
was the strongest Populist ward in the city, that at least one of the 
pro-Ware board members, a former grand master workman of the 
Knights of Labor, Milledge M. Connor, was an active member of 
the People's party, and that another, Dr. James P. Smith, was 
widely "recognized as a true & stanch [sic] friend of the mill peo-
ple," most of whom were of the white working class.29 Although a 
compromise had been rumored before the meeting, the board 
merely offered to restore Ware when economic conditions per-
mitted. Recognizing the hollowness of this promise, the blacks im-
mediately brought two suits in the local Superior Court. 
The Negroes chose as their lawyers three whites who had never 
before publicly exhibited any special sympathy for the race, but 
" German, "Queen City," 92; Augusta Chronicle, July 27, 1894; May 14, 1895; July II, 
16, August 26, 29, September 23, 1897; February 19, 1900. The description of Smith is in 
Augusta Tribune, January 10, 1899. 
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who were each, in some respect, rebels against the close-knit 
Augusta establishment. Born in New York, the chief counsel, Salem 
Dutcher, Jr., was an intellectual and a fellow-traveler with the Pop-
ulists and had led an abortive crusade in 1894 against Augusta's 
most powerful politician. One of Dutcher's cocounsels, Hamilton 
Phinizy, though born to affluence and social status, was a public 
agnostic. The other, JosephS. Reynolds, was a self-made man who 
worked as a drugstore clerk and traveling salesman to support him-
selfwhile he read law. Neither Dutcher, Phinizy, nor Reynolds was 
then among the recognized leaders of the Augusta bar. 
The briefs which these lawyers filed in the Superior Court in 
Cumming and a companion case, Albert S. Blodgett and Jerry M. 
Griffin v. School Board. focused directly on the equal-protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. For the board to continue to support the Tubman and Hephzi-
bah high schools for whites while eliminating Ware, they con-
tended, was simply an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. 
If, as the school board alleged, it lacked the means to extend black 
primary schools to all who desired to enroll, that condition arose 
from ''the illegal action of said Board in appropriating to the white 
school population of said City largely more of the public school 
fund than it is legally entitled to." Their clients having exhausted 
the available nonjudicial remedies, counsel asked in the Blodgett 
case for a mandamus directing the board to reinstate Ware and in 
Cumming for injunctions to prevent the county tax collector from 
gathering that part of the school tax which went to high schools and 
to bar the board from spending any money on white high schools 
unless they also continued Ware. 50 
The lawyers filed two separate cases because they disagreed about 
the appropriate mode of action in the complicated area of the nine-
teenth-century "extraordinary remedies," such as writs of manda-
mus and injunction. Originally instituted in the English courts of 
equity and common law because general laws failed to do justice in 
particular cases, the writs circumvented the harsh principles and 
ponderous usages of the common-law courts. Although the prac-
•• The quotation is from George F. Edmunds's printed brief in "File Copies of Briefs, 
1899," Vol. 14, Case No. 164, p. 21, in U. S. Supreme Court Library, hereinafter referred to 
as Supreme Court File. Other information on the local briefs is in Augusta Chronicle, Sep-
tember 22, 1897; and Transcript of Record No. 621, October Term, 1898, Appellate Case File 
No. 17206, in National Archives, Washington, D. C., referred to hereinafter as National 
Archives File. Since Blodgett was never considered as important a case by counsel and since 
the plaintiffs in that case apparently took no part in raising money or propagandizing for the 
cases, I have devoted less attention to them. Blodgett, a mulatto who may have been the son 
of white Reconstructionist Foster Blodgett, Jr., was a grocer whose son married one of John 
Ladeveze's sisters. Griffin was a brown-skinned barber and president of one of the town's 
largest benevolent societies, whose son later married one of James Harper's daughters. 
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tices and procedures of law and equity courts had been gradually 
merged in the United States and although the "extraordinary" rem-
edies were fast becoming more ordinary in the late nineteenth cen-
tury, the writs retained so.mething of their special character. Neither 
writ would be issued until the petitioners had exhausted all other 
possible courses of legal action, and neither would be granted in 
"doubtful" cases. Moreover, an injunction was purely negative, an 
order by a court of equity designed to prevent someone from acting. 
By contrast, the common-law writ of mandamus was an order to a 
public official to carry out some positive act, usually to do some-
thing he had refused to do, more rarely to rescind or reverse an 
action already taken. Of equal importance in these cases, the cir-
cumstances in which courts would issue writs of mandamus were 
changing in the late nineteenth century. Thus, a leading legal text of 
the era repeated the traditional view that "mandamus will lie to 
compel the performance of duties purely ministerial in their nature, 
when they are so clear and specific that no element of discretion is 
left in their performance," but it also stated that "where a discre-
tion is abused, and made to work injustice, it may be controlled by 
mandamus.'' 51 
Largely ignoring the equal-protection clause argument, school 
board counsel Joseph Ganahl, who had been chairman of the 
board's high school committee since 1876, and Frank H. Miller, a 
respected legal craftsman in whose offices Dutcher, Phinizy, and 
Reynolds had all studied law, concentrated on the question of how 
much discretion the board had. 52 It was clear that under Section 10 
of the 1872 act setting up the Richmond County schools the board 
could establish, maintain, or close any number of high schools, set 
tuition fees at any sum, hire and fire high school personnel, erect or 
demolish high school buildings. And in fact, in 1878 the board had 
dropped its subsidies to two previously semipublic high schools for 
" On the development of equity law, see John N. Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurispru-
dence . .. (San Francisco, 1907), 5-20; Owen W. Fiss, Injunctions (Mineola, N. Y., 1972), 
9-11, 75-76. The quotations are from Thomas C. Spelling, A Treatise on Injunctions and 
Other Extraordinary Remedies (2d ed., Boston, 1901), 250, 1255. For similar treatments of 
mandamus see Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations . .. (6th 
ed., Boston, 1890), 136-37; and Forrest G. Ferris and Forrest G. Ferris, Jr., The Law of 
Extraordinary Remedies(St. Louis, Mo., 1926), Sections 206 and 209. Only Dutcher signed 
the later brief appealing Blodgett to the Georgia Supreme Court. For the disagreement on 
strategy between counsel see Augusta Chronicle, March 25, 1898. 
11 For biographical details on Miller see William J. Northen, Men of Mark in Georgia (7 
vols., Spartanburg, S. C., 1974), IV, 33-38; Lucian L. Knight, A Standard History ofGeor-
giaandGeorgians(6vo1s., Chicago and New York, 1917), V, 2777-78. The ironic fact that all 
three lawyers for the blacks were Miller's pupils I learned from Scholes' Directory of the City 
of Augusta (Augusta, 1886), 311; Augusta Chronicle, December 24, 1917; and a private letter 
from Mary R. Powell to author. 
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whites, the Richmond and Summerville academies. The question 
was whether Section 9 ofthe 1872 act or the equal-protection clause 
limited the board's discretion in governing high schools. Arguing 
that Section 9 applied only to the previous sections of the act, which 
required the board to establish a system of primary schools, and 
that Section 10 on high schools granted the board absolute discre-
tion, Ganahl and Miller contended that the board was within its 
rights in "temporarily" suspending Ware because of a lack of 
funds. Since it would have been "unwise and unconscionable to 
keep up a high school for sixty pupils and tum away three hundred 
little negroes who were asking to be taught their alphabet and to 
read and write,'' the board's actions were also equitable. Therefore, 
the plaintiffs' contentions had no basis in either law or equity.55 
In a decision which the Chronicle termed "what most of those 
familiar with the law thought it must be," Superior Court judge 
Enoch H. Calloway, a plantation-born former state senator whose 
reputation as a racial moderate did not prevent his later becoming 
chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee, enjoined 
the board but denied other relief.'~ Granting the contention of 
Ganahl and Miller that the board had discretion to abolish all the 
high schools or tailor them to fit the needs of students of different 
races and geographical areas, Calloway contended that once the 
board did decide to open public high school facilities for whites, it 
had to offer them to blacks as well. Properly declining to rest his 
decision on a constitutional provision if a statutory basis was possi-
ble, Calloway argued that unless Section 9 was read as limiting the 
board's discretion under Section 10 the whole scheme would con-
travene the equal-protection clause. Therefore, solely on the basis 
of the statute, he enjoined the board from spending any money on 
white high schools without reopening Ware. Yet, since he admitted 
that the board could at its discretion abolish the high schools en-
tirely and since there was some doubt whether it had sufficient 
funds to run the high schools, Calloway declined to issue the man-
damus called for in Blodgett. And because the tax levy for high 
schools was not separable from that for elementary schools, it 
would have been "unwise," according to the judge, for the court to 
engender confusion by enjoining the tax collector. 
Raising no new arguments in their beliefs, counsel for both the 
" See Ganahl and Miller, "Return to Rule,'' 16, National Archives File. 
•• The quotation is from the Augusta Chronicle, December 24, 1897. For biographical 
details on Calloway see the Chronicle, November 11, 1894; September 29, November 3, 5, 15, 
1898; Augusta Herald, October 30, 1898; Allen D. Candler and Clement A. Evans, eds., 
Georgia (3 vols., Atlanta, Ga., 1906), I, 295-99, for more biographical details. For his 
opinions in Cumming and Blodgett see Augusta Chronicle, December 23, 24, 1897. 
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board and the blacks appealed the decisions to the Georgia Supreme 
Court. Speaking for a unanimous court, Chief Justice Thomas Jef-
'ferson Simmons, a former Confederate colonel and president of the 
state Senate, and a leading delegate to the 1877 state constitutional 
convention, ruled in favor of the board. In an opinion studded with 
factual inaccuracies and petty technicalities, Simmons, who had 
gone far out of his way in an earlier case to declare constitutional the 
practice of refusing to spend on black schools in the town of Eaton-
ton any money derived from local taxes on whites, overruled 
Calloway's construction of the 1872 act and blithely dismissed, 
without giving any reasons or citing any precedents, the equal-
protection argument. Section 9, in Simmons's view had no effect on 
Section 10, which granted the board entirely unlimited discretion 
over high schools. Moreover, the black taxpayers had no more right 
to complain that they were taxed to support high schools without 
receiving any benefits from them than did white taxpayers who had 
no children currently enrolled in the public high schools. Finally, 
the same arguments which he cited to dissolve the injunction dic-
tated denial of the petition for mandamus against the board. 35 Al-
though it had expected the state Supreme Court to uphold Callo-
way, the Chronicle of March 25, 1898, greeted Simmons's decision 
as providing "the greatest good for the greatest number." "While 
the movers in the opposition ... were, no doubt, impelled by a 
desire to maintain the interests of their race as they saw them, they 
will in the end see that the board has acted wisely in the mat-
ter .... " It was better to give the black masses the "bread and 
meat" of primary schools, the paper had stated in December 1897 
than to provide the "pati de foie gras [sic]" of high schools for the 
Negro elite. 56 
Ladeveze, Harper, and their compatriots did not despair. Rather, 
they enlarged the scope of their fund-raising and propaganda ef-
forts (garnering, for example, the munificent sums of $5.06 from 
two churches in Savannah and $5.00 from Booker T. Washington) 
and recruited as their counsel for the appeal to the United States 
Supreme Court one of the country's outstanding constitutional and 
•• 29 S.E. 488 (1898). For biographical facts about Simmons see Augusta Chronicle, Octo-
ber 29, 1894. The briefs are in the Supreme Court File. Simmons's earlier dictum came in 
Reid v. Town of Eatonton, 80 Ga. 755, 758 (1888). In an attempt to strengthen his case 
against allegations of racial discrimination by the board, Simmons denied, contrary to facts 
stipulated by both sides, that the board had ever supported a boys' high school for whites. To 
buttress his contention that Section 10 was completely separate from the foregoing regula-
tions of the free common schools, he patently misread the 1877 amendments as requiring 
tuition at high schools, instead of merely allowing the board discretion on whether or not to 
charge tuition. 
"Augusta Chronicle, January 28, March 25, 1898 (first quotation); December 24, 1897 
(other quotations). 
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corporation lawyers, George Franklin Edmunds. 37 
A United States senator from Vermont from 1866 to 1891, Ed-
munds was an unreconstructed Radical Republican who, along with 
many other Republicans of the late nineteenth century, believed 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect human rights 
as well as those of corporations. One of the leading lawyers for the 
Southern Pacific Railroad in the important San Mateo and Santa 
Clara cases, which established the proposition that corporations 
were meant to be included as "persons" under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and for the challengers of the federal income tax in 
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust, Edmunds had been one of the 
principal framers of the 1890 Sherman Antitrust Law as well as the 
1871 Ku Klux Klan bill and the 1875 Civil Rights Act. Indeed, it was 
to Edmunds that Justice John Marshall Harlan had turned for con-
sultation when he drafted his famous dissent in the 1883 Civil Rights 
Cases, and Harlan's opinion in that case closely followed the argu-
ments and even some of the phraseology of Edmunds's earlier Sen-
ate speeches in defense of the Civil Rights Act. A close adviser to 
Presidents Ulysses Simpson Grant and Rutherford Birchard Hayes 
and a serious candidate for the Republican nomination for Presi-
dent in 1884, Edmunds had turned down two offers of appointment 
to the Supreme Court. Recruited by Harper while wintering at the 
resort town of Aiken, South Carolina, which was only fifteen miles 
from Augusta, Edmunds was so touched by the blacks' plight that 
he took the case without fee. 58 Thus, even before the founding of 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) in 1909, black litigants in civil rights cases were repre-
" For the fund raising see Savannah Tribune, November 5, 12, 1898; Ladeveze to 
Washington, June 1898; November 11, 17, 1898, in Container 142, Booker T. Washington 
Papers (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.). Despite the appeal 
to Washington to help in the fund raising, the Augustans were forced to rely almost entirely 
on their own resources. For earlier fund-raising activities see Augusta Chronicle, January 14, 
1898. In contrast, the NAACP received a $100,000 grant from the liberal Garland Fund in 
1929 to fight for equalization of school facilities among other things. See Kluger, Simple 
Justice, 132-33. 
•• The fact that Edmunds burned all his papers before he died probably accounts fot the 
lack of a published biography. Selig Adler's "The Senatorial Career of George Franklin 
Edmunds, 1866-1891" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1934) pro-
vided most of the scanty biographical details. Other information derives from Santa Clara 
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. 118 U.S. 394 (1886); Howard J. Graham, 
Everyman's Constitution: Historical Essays on the Fourteenth Amendment, the "Con-
spiracy Theory," and American Constitutionalism (Madison, Wis., 1968), 88n; Alan F. 
Westin," John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transforma-
tion of a Southerner," Yale Law Journal, LXVI (Apri11957), 240n, and an undated note by 
Laura Harper in the Harper Family Papers. It is interesting to compare the devotion of 
Edmunds to the rights of the downtrodden with the scorn shown by a leading twentieth-
century corporation lawyer, John W. Davis, on whom see William H. Harbaugh's Lawyer's 
Lawyer: The Life of John W. Davis (New York, 1973). 
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sented by well-qualified-in this case, superlative-counsel. The 
Supreme Court's repeated rulings against Negroes in this period did 
n.ot, with one exception, result from inadequate lawyers. 59 
In what may have been a tactical error, Edmunds decided to ap-
peal only Cumming, on which there was a full record of depositions, 
briefs, and decisions, but to let Blodgett go. Since Chief Justice 
Simmons had not bothered to file a full opinion in Blodgett, it was 
unclear on the face of the decision whether a ''substantial federal 
question" was involved. Probably more important, the Georgia Su-
preme Court had ruled that the 1872 statute granted the board com-
plete discretion in governing high schools, and a mandamus, at least 
according to the traditional view, could not control a discretionary 
act. Since the federal courts would not overturn the highest state 
court's construction of its state's laws, the question of discretion 
must have seemed muddled, at the very least. Confident that he had 
a winnable case, Edmunds may have thought that the Cumming 
case raised the issues sufficiently that the question of the form of 
remedy made little difference. 40 And there was good reason for that 
confidence. 
Though the Supreme Court had never before ruled on racial dis-
crimination in education per se, its previous Fourteenth Amend-
ment decisions seemed to support the position of Edmunds's 
clients. The Court had been willing to intervene to protect railroads 
and Chinese laundrymen from "arbitrary classifications" or dis-
criminatory actions of legislative, executive, or judicial officers of 
the states and to launch independent investigations to determine 
whether in fact the discretion allowed by various statutes had been 
employed in an "unjust" or "unethical" manner. Despite its nega-
tive phraseology, the equal-protection clause had been held to pro-
vide blacks with a "positive immunity" against legal discrimina-
.. The attorney general or solicitor general appeared for the blacks in U.S. v. Reese et al. 
(92 U.S. 214); U.S. v. Cruikshank(92U.S. 542);Strauderv. West Virginia(IOOU.S. 303);Ex 
parte Virginia(IOOU.S. 339); ExparteSiebold(IOO U.S. 371); U.S. v. Harris(l06 U.S. 629); 
Ex parte Yarbrough (110 U.S. 651); The Civil Rights Cases (109 U.S. 3); and James v. 
Bowman (190 U.S. 127)·. In Plessy the chieflawyer was the respected "Judge" Albion Tour-
gee; in the 1903 Alabama disfranchisement cases, Giles v. Harris (189 U.S. 475) and Giles v. 
Teasley (193 U.S. 146), black lawyer Wilford H. Smith filed competent briefs; and in the 
1904 Virginia disfranchisement cases of Jones v. Montague (194 U.S. 147) and Selden v. 
Montague (194 U.S. 153) the blacks were represented by John Sergeant Wise, an excellent 
lawyer who practiced on Wall Street as well as in Virginia. The exception referred to was 
Cornelius J. Jones, a blustering black Vicksburg attorney, whose failure to present the dis-
franchisement case of Williams v. Mississippi (170 U.S. 213) correctly allowed the Court 
easily to sidestep the crucial precedent. For his bluster see the file on Williams v. Mississippi 
in the National Archives. 
•• Edmunds's confidence is reflected in his correspondence with the Supreme Court (Na-
tional Archives File) and in a letter from Ladeveze to Booker T. Washington, November II, 
1898, in Container 142, Washington Papers. 
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tions which "lessen[ed] the security of their rights which others 
enjoy.'' Moreover, the Plessy case, on which Ganahl and Miller put 
so much emphasis, actually allowed racial distinctions only if the 
accommodations on segregated railway cars were equal. Even if the 
segregation of school children was constitutional-and Edmunds 
did not challenge it directly in his brief-the opportunities offered 
students of each race had to be substantially the same, if the court 
followed the "equal, but separate" rule of Plessy. Abolishing Ware 
was, Edmunds charged, an "arbitrary denial of the equal protec-
tion of the law," not an action which the Fourteenth Amendment 
left to the discretion of the school board. 41 
While Edmunds did not examine state and federal district court 
opinions on school discrimination, the vast majority of previous 
decisions in both southern and northern courts favored his views, 
and his failure to discuss them was probably a mistake. The leading 
federal cases were U. S. v. Buntin and Claybrook v. Owensboro. In 
Buntin Judge John Baxter instructed a federal jury that it did not 
have to grant the petition of a black child who wished to enter a 
white school as long as the segregated school provided by the states 
offered "substantially the same facilities and educational advan-
tages that were offered in the school established for the white 
children .... "In Claybrook Judge John Watson Barr, a friend of 
Justice Harlan's, declared unconstitutional a Kentucky statute 
which set up a racially segregated local taxation and expenditure 
system for schools in Owensboro, Kentucky. The equal-protection 
clause, Barr asserted, "can only mean that the laws of the states 
must be equal in their benefit, as well as equal in their bur-
dens ... ," and while absolute equality was "impracticable," the 
distribution had to be made "upon some fair and equal classifica-
tion or basis. " 42 State court decisions from Arkansas, California, 
Kentucky, New York, and North Carolina all upheld the view that 
the equal-protection clause guaranteed "equal benefits" or "equal 
advantages.''48 Summarizing state and federal cases on the subject 
"'Quotations are from Edmunds's printed brief, 12-15, in Supreme Court File, citing 
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chicago, (166 U.S. 226); Gulf, Colorado, 
and SantaFeRailroadCompanyv.E/Iis(l65 U.S. 150); Yick Wov. Hopkins(ll8 U.S. 356); 
Strauder v. West Virginia (100 U.S. 303); and Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537). In his 
opinion in Cumming Harlan implied that at the oral argument Edmunds had challenged 
school segregation per se. The Court, however, declined to rule on that question on the stated 
grounds that the legality of segregation had been conceded in the lower courts and in the 
briefs. 
•• U. S. v. Buntin, 10 F. 730, 735 (1882); Claybrook v. Owensboro, 16 F. 297, 302 (1883) . 
., Maddoxv. Neal, 45 Ark. 121 (1885); Wardv. Flood, 48 Cal. 36(1874); Dawson v. Lee, 
83 Ky. 49 (1885); People ex. rei. King v. Gallagher, 93 N.Y. 438 (1883); Puitt v. Gaston 
County Commissioners, 94 N.C. 709 (1885). For discussions of these and similar cases see 
Gilbert T. Stephenson, Race Distinctions in American Law (New York, 1910), 196-99; 
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in the 1891 edition of his General Principles of Constitutional Law, 
Judge Thomas Mcintyre Cooley, the leading legal commentator of 
the day, declared school segregation constitutional only if "the 
schools are equal in advantages, and the same measure of privilege 
and opportunity is afforded in each."44 To rule against the black 
appellants in Cumming, therefore, the Supreme Court would have 
to set its face against a line of precedent firmly established in the 
lower courts. 
Yet in a deeper, less strictly logical sense the trend of Supreme 
Court decisions was unfavorable to the blacks' cause. The over-
whelming fact was that the Court had rarely been willing to act or 
even to allow Congress to act to protect blacks against the assaults 
of the states or individuals. The Slaughter-House Cases had nar-
rowed the scope of the privileges and immunities of U. S. citizens so 
much that the clause of the Fourteenth Amendment became nearly 
meaningless; Reese, Cruikshank, Harris, and Williams had under-
mined federal protection of voting rights; the Civil Rights Cases had 
outlawed federal power to prohibit racial discrimination in most 
commercial transactions by a very strict definition of "state ac-
tion"; Plessy had ruled segregation constitutional. ' 5 Moreover, at 
the same time that it stripped Negro rights of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's protections the Court had increasingly employed it 
to restrict congressional and state legislative efforts to control the 
economy. Committed to the difficult and controversial task of judi-
cial oversight of the regulation of businesses, the Court must have 
hesitated to get involved in reviewing decisions of school boards, 
too. Suppose the Supreme Court granted the injunction and the 
school board complied by erecting a new building in which to house 
the black high school. Then, Ganahl suggested in his brief, could 
not the Negroes demand that the local court ensure that the black 
and white schools were entirely equal in facilities brick by brick, in 
staff salary by salary, and in other respects? Would not such a situa-
tion inextricably intertwine the courts in matters better left to ''po-
litical" bodies such as the school board, whose actions could be 
Charles S. Mangum, Jr., The Legal Status of the Negro (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1940), 89-91, 
126-31; Maurice L. Risen, Legal Aspects of Separation of Races in the Public Schools 
(Philadelphia, 1935), 48-51, 70-84. 
•• Cooley, The General Principles of Constitutional Law in United States of America (2d 
ed., Boston, 1891), 242; and similarly, Cooley's A Treatise on the Law of Torts, or the 
Wrongs Which Arise Independent of Contract (2d ed., Chicago, 1888), 338-39, which was 
still the current edition of this book in 1899. 
•• The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). For citations to the other 
cases, see note 39 above. There are good discussions of these cases (but a misleading treat-
ment of Cumming) in Robert J. Harris, The Quest for Equality: The Constitution, Congress 
and the Supreme Court (Baton Rouge, La., 1960), 57-109. 
. 
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reviewed directly by the voters? Should the courts intervene in a case 
where it was doubtful whether a high school for sixty pupils served 
the interests of blacks better than elementary classes for two hun-
dred? Even granting all these points, Miller and Ganahl continued, 
wasn't it necessary for the appellants to show bad faith on the part 
of the board to be able to claim a remedy at equity? Since "no evil 
eye or combination is averred or shown against the Board of Educa-
tion," should the courts step in to reverse what was at most "an 
error of judgment," not an act directed at the blacks "on account 
or' their race?46 
The indifference to Negro rights of most of the justices who faced 
these questions on the United States Supreme Court is too well 
known to require comment. But what of John Marshall Harlan, 
whose caustic, lonely dissents in Civil Rights, P/essy, and other 
cases have led prominent scholars to describe him as a man with ''a 
messianic commitment to Negro rights," who gave "undeviating 
support to Negro civil rights" on the bench?47 That a former slave-
holder and staunch antebellum defender of the Dred Scott decision, 
who before 1868 bitterly denounced the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and Negro suffrage should become a more faithful 
defender of black rights than any of his northern colleagues on the 
Court has lent a certain air of romance to his career and intrigued 
historians attracted by paradoxes and Pauline ideological conver-
sions.48 And in addition to his generally pro-Negro judicial stance, 
Harlan had a special reason to look favorably on the appellants' 
•• Ganahl brief, 8, 12, 17, Supreme Court File; Miller brief, 14, 20, ibid . 
., The quotations are, respectively, from White, American Judicial Tradition, 133; and 
Westin,'' John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes,'' 697; Similarly, 
see Lewis I. Maddocks, "Justice John Marshall Harlan: Defender of Individual Rights" 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1959), !08; Westin, An Autobiogra-
phy of the Supreme Court (New York and London, 1963), 118; Florian Bartosic, "The 
Constitution, Civil Liberties, and John Marshall Harlan," Kentucky Law Journal, XL VI 
(Spring 1958), 446. For a more careful and qualified opinion see Louis Filler, "John M. 
Harlan," in Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel, eds., The Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court 1789-1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions (4 vols., New York and Lon-
don, 1969), II, 1281-95. 
•• Maddocks," Justice John Marshall Harlan," 1-47; David G. Farrelly, "Harlan's For-
mative Period: The Years Before the War," Kentucky Law Journal, XLVI (Spring 1958), 
367-406; Ellwood W. Lewis, "Document: The Appointment of Mr. Justice Harlan," In· 
diana Law Review, XXIX (Fall 1953), 46-74; Westin, "John Marshall Harlan and the Con-
stitutional Rights of Negroes" 658-69; E. Bruce Thompson, "The Bristow Presidential 
Boom of 1876," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXXII (June 1945), 3-30. The only 
published biographies of Harlan, those of Floyd B. Clark, The Constitutional Doctrines of 
Justice Harlan (Baltimore, 1915), and Frank B. Latham, The Great Dissenter: John Marshall 
Harlan, 1833-/9Jl (New York, 1970), add no important details. Woodward, American 
Counterpoint, 224; White, American Judicial Tradition, 131-33, 138-43; and Westin, 
"John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes," 698, are attracted by the 
paradoxes of Harlan. Westin particularly emphasizes his alleged "conversion" on black-
rights issues in 1868. 
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case in Cumming. As Republican gubernatorial candidate in Ken-
tucky in 1871 Harlan had made equal education for all whites one of 
his main themes. Nominated again in 1875, Harlan extended his call 
for equality across racial lines, announcing at every speech in his 
extensive canvass his belief in equalizing state school expenditures 
for blacks and whites. ''The education of the colored children of the 
Commonwealth is a matter of the profoundest concern to every 
right-hearted, liberal-minded citizen," candidate Harlan an-
nounced in one typical debate with his 1875 Democratic opponent. 
''There is no question of graver moment presented for our consider-
ation." Approvingly, he quoted the 1875 state Republican 
platform's statement on the issue: " ... as a measure of justice, no 
less than wise statesmanship, we hold that the provision now made 
for the education of colored children shall be increased until they 
are afforded, in their separate schools, facilities for obtaining in-
struction in every respect equal to those provided for white 
children. " 49 Thus, the issues raised by Cumming were hardly new to 
Harlan. Fuily aware of the importance of public education in pro-
viding equal opportunities to poor whites and blacks, Harlan had 
twenty-four years earlier committed himself wholeheartedly to 
equal expenditure regardless of race or the amount of taxes paid. 
Yet in his opinion for the Court Harlan almost casually accepted 
the arguments and statements of fact of Miller and Ganahl. Citing 
no previous cases from either state or federal courts, the justice 
circumvented the question of whether Plessy required equal privi-
leges by simply not discussing it. Predicting ingenuously that the 
school board would respond to an injunction by closing the white 
high schools instead of by reopening Ware, Harlan concluded that 
the proposed injunctive remedy would damage white children 
without assisting blacks. 50 Ignoring the fact that mandamus had 
rarely been held to control discretionary acts and seemingly un-
aware of the existence of the Blodgett case, Harlan suggested that if 
the blacks had sought an order compelling the board to reopen 
Ware, "different questions might have arisen in the state court." 51 
•• The Democratic platform was silent on the issue, and gubernatorial candidate James B. 
McCreary opposed taxing whites to pay for black schools. For the speech see Louisville 
Courier-Journal, July 5, 1875. During the campaign Harlan did constantly condemn "mixed 
schools" and the public-accommodations sections of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, which he 
later defended in his Civil Rights Cases dissent. 
•• Everyone appears to have assumed from the first that the board, if enjoined, would 
reestablish Ware, and Ganahl's brief, 15-16, Supreme Court File, conceded as much. 
" Although the printed record of Cumming, 46, Supreme Court File, did refer to "the 
mandamus case," Blodgett was nowhere stressed. If such considerations had occurred to 
Harlan early enough, of course, he might have satisfied them at the oral argument, but since 
no record of that argument survives, we cannot determine whether Harlan misstated the facts 
RACISM AND U.S. SUPREME COURT 39 
But Harlan went beyond all previous cases in acceding to the argu-
ment of the board lawyers that the blacks to sustain an equal-
protection claim had to demonstrate "that the Board proceeded in 
bad faith . . . , " that the allegedly discriminatory action was moti-
vated by' 'hostility to the colored population because of their race.'' 
And he qualified his acknowledgment that "all admit that the bene-
fits and burdens of public taxation must be shared by citizens 
without discrimination against any class" by adding the words "on 
account of their race," and implicitly transferred the burden of 
proof on the question of motivation from the board to the blacks. 
Unlike the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited denial of the 
suffrage "on account of race" (and therefore seemingly not on ac-
count of property, literacy, or other correlates of race), the Four-
teenth Amendment stated its guarantee of nondiscrimination 
without qualification. "No State shall," the Fourteenth Amend-
ment commanded, '' ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.'' The wording implies that not only 
could there be no discrimination because of race but also that the 
denial of equal treatment for any reason was unlawful, that no sub-
terfuge for racial discrimination would pass constitutional muster. 
Harlan's judicial amendment of the Constitution, interpreted in 
light of the circumstances in Cumming, meant that it would not be 
possible for a Negro to prove discrimination by demonstrating that 
whites got a disproportionate share of public benefits .. Instead, 
states could blatantly deny blacks equal protection so long as there 
was no direct evidence that they did so because of race. Yet, what 
other rationale could have underlain the board's decisions (detailed 
in Edmund's brief) to provide sufficient elementary schools for 
whites but not blacks, to pay substantially higher salaries to white 
than black teachers, to close Ware while continuing two white high 
schools? If, as Harlan's statement implied, a public body could 
evade the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements by dissimulating 
about its reasons for acting sufficiently to demonstrate to a 
southern state court that there was some other rational basis for its 
behavior, and if, to overcome this defense, the blacks had to show 
positively that it was race and race alone which led to the public 
body's move, then the promise of equal protection became only a 
derisive taunt. sz 
of the state court case-the blacks had, indeed, asked for a mandamus-deliberately or by 
mistake. 
•• All quotations are from 175 U.S. 544-45; 011 the "racial hostility" test, see E.J.R. 
''Legality of Race Segregation in Educational Institutions," University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review, LXXXII (December 1933), 157-64. 
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What accounts for Harlan's opinion? Why did he not dissent in 
Cumming as he had so sharply and memorably in Civil Rights and 
P/essy, thereby laying the groundwork for some future court to 
reverse its racist direction? Though his voluminous papers at the 
Library of Congress and the University of Louisville Law School 
contain no information gn Cumming and shed little light on 
Harlan's attitude toward Negro rights, scholars have offered 
several explanations for his decision. Some, focusing on his unwill-
ingness to rule on the segregation question, merely note his strict 
construction of the judicial practice of refusing to decide matters 
which have not been fully argued and ignore or minimize the overall 
inconsistency of Cumming with Harlan's opinions in other cases on 
black equality. 53 Concentrating too narrowly on segregation, which 
is merely one form of racial discrimination, they appear to under-
estimate how much difference it might have made in the lives of 
black people in America if the court had enforced equal benefits 
even if the services were segregated. 
A second group has tried to explain the inconsistency by suggest-
ing, without bothering to examine the full record of the case, that 
the lawyers for the blacks had not placed sufficient emphasis on the 
equal-protection clause or "clumsily presented" the issues. 54 While 
Edmunds did make the tactical mistakes of not appealing Blodgett 
and not discussing lower court decisions, it seems very unlikely that 
these errors determined the result, for his brief presented the essen-
tial inequity and unconstitutionality of the situation clearly and in 
sufficient detail for the Court, acting within the relatively loose 
constraints of equity principles, to have decided in his clients' favor 
had it so desired. 
A third attempt to explain Harlan's stance suggests that the jus-
tice was moved by the facts that closing Ware allowed the board to 
increase the opportunities for black elementary students and that 
former Ware students could attend private high schools with no 
increase in tuition. But, as Edmunds's brief pointed out, the board 
could have met the demand for more places in the black elementary 
"Albert P. Blaustein and Clarence C. Ferguson, Jr., Desegregation and the Law: The 
Meaning and Effect of the School Segregation Cases (New Brunswick, N. J., 1957), 100; 
Loren Miller, The Petitioners: The Story of the Supreme Court of the United States and the 
Negro (New York, 1966), 213-14; Westin, "John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional 
Rights of Negroes," 689. 
54 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race, Racism, and American Law (Boston and Toronto, 1973), 
449-51; Clark Spurlock, Education and the Supreme Court (Urbana, Ill., 1955), 181-84 
(quotation on p. 183); Monte Canfield, Jr.," 'Our Constitution Is Color-Blind': Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan and Modern Problems of Civil Rights," University of Missouri at Kansas City 
Law Review, XXXII (Summer 1964), 311-12; Maddocks," Justice John Marshall Harlan," 
98; Kluger, Simple Justice, 121. 
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schools by the constitutionally preferable means of raising the tax 
rate or diverting funds from the comparatively affluent white 
sch'ools. The presence of private high schools, as Edmunds also 
noted, was irrelevant to the constitutional question of equality in 
public services. 55 
A fourth view is that in Cumming'' Harlan was probably continu-
ing a subtle war against segregation legislation ... , '' undermining 
the "separate but equal" standard by denying the Court's right to 
look into most exercises of state "police power," thereby showing 
that the Court could never guarantee equality in racially separate 
institutions and implying that the only way to fulfill the goal of the 
equal-protection clause was to end segregation. This overrefined 
apologetic ignores Harlan's stout defense of segregated schools in 
Kentucky during the 1870s. Since the Court took no cases from 1877 
to 1911 in which the issue of public school integration could not be 
sidestepped and since his private papers contain nothing bearing 
directly on the problem, there is simply no evidence that Harlan 
changed his mind on school integration after he went on the 
Court. 56 
A fifth line of argument would simply downplay the importance 
of the case. Perhaps Harlan just did not spend very much time 
thinking about it, did not realize how much more important it was 
to the vast majority of Negroes that they have adequate educational 
opportunities than that they ride in a ''first-class'' car on a railroad. 
Perhaps he was ignorant of the rapidly growing gulf between expen-
ditures for black and white schools in the South. But Harlan had 
certainly long been aware of the problem of racial discrimination in 
education and believed in the centrality of equalizing educational 
opportunities during his gubernatorial campaigns of 1871 and 1875. 
And, as chief judge on the Sixth Circuit Court after February 1896 
he must have known of the continuing efforts by his home state to 
deny blacks equal schools .57 Even if he had forgotten what he had 
said two decades earlier and failed to observe widely known facts, 
why would he have bothered to erect such a high barrier to further 
" Loren P. Beth, "Justice Harlan and the Uses of Dissent," American Political Science 
Review, XLIX (December 1955), 1091-92; Edmunds's brief, 11-12, Supreme Court File. 
•• Edward H. Hobbs, "Negro Education and the Equal Protection for the Laws," Journal 
of Politics, XIV (August 1952), 495-97 (quotation on p. 496). Harlan could have dealt with 
public school segregation in Plessyor in the 1908 case of Berea College v. Commonwealth of 
Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, but chose not to do so. 
" On the extensive litigation of such questions in Kentucky see Stephenson, Race Distinc-
tions, 196-98; Mangum, Legal Status of the Negro, 120-25. The 1896 case of Davenport v. 
Cloverport, 72 F. 689, decided by Harlan's friend Judge John W. Barr, raised issues very 
similar to Cumming. In the 1898 case of Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson City, 173 U.S. 
592, Harlan's opinion for the Court cited an earlier state court case dealing with the same 
issues, Marshall v. Donovan, 73 Ky. 681 (1874). 
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challenges to discrimination if he merely thought this a minor case 
rather than a crucial precedent in a key area of the law? 
Nor will an explanation drawing on Harlan's judicial habits or 
general philosophy shed much light on Cumming. Customarily 
straightforward in logic, he was impatient with legal casuistry, ac-
cusing the majority in the Civil Rights Cases, for instance, of under-
mining the Fourteenth Amendment through "a subtle and inge-
nious verbal criticism." Yet his assumption that the board would 
close the white schools rather than reopen Ware was casuistical in 
the extreme, and his "racial hostility" test for equal protection was 
just the sort of outright judicial amending of the Constitution for 
which Harlan often berated his colleagues on the bench.58 An ar-
dent nationalist who generally opposed state economic regulation 
as well as state infringements on noneconomic rights, Harlan in this 
case exalted states' rights at the expense of enforcement by the fed-
eral courts of constitutional guarantees.59 Unconstrained by such 
sophisticated theories as legal realism, which might have led him to 
defer to legislatures or cautioned him against projecting his own 
policy predilections into the Constitution, Harlan loosely followed 
a model of judging which, in G. Edward White's words, "was pri-
marily designed to implement his individual convictions. It placed a 
premium on arriving at desirable results, not on internal consis-
tency."60 
But these observations merely complicate the Cumming puzzle, 
for if "intuition" was Harlan's chief guide, and satisfaction of his 
policy ends his only thread of consistency, one is left with the view 
that Harlan simply desired the result in Cumming, that while he was 
eager to defend the largely symbolic exercises of their rights by the 
few turn-of-the-century blacks who could afford to attend inte-
grated colleges, to patronize integrated theaters or hotels, or to buy 
first-class railway tickets, he was either blind to the much more 
practical problem, which directly affected much larger numbers of 
Negroes, of obtaining a decent education, or he opposed, at this 
time in his career at least, granting equal public services to blacks. 
Whatever Harlan's motives, the results of Cumming were very 
clear. The case gave the southern and other states a green light to 
heighten discrimination in publicly funded activities and dis-
"Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883); Henry J. Abraham," John Marshall Harlan: 
The Justice and the Man," Kentucky Law Journal, XL VI (Spring 1958), 450. For an example 
of Harlan's criticism of his colleagues' amendment of the Constitution by judicial decree see 
his bitter dissent in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, 158 U.S. 601 (1895). 
" For Harlan's nationalistic views on economic matters see Mary Porter, ''John Marshall 
Harlan and the Laissez-Faire Court (1877-1910)" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer-
sity of Chicago, 1971). 
•• White, American Judicial Tradition, 130. 
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couraged black litigants from seeking redress in the federal courts. 
After all, if the court would not overturn a system which flatly 
denied to blacks a service which it offered to whites, it surely would 
not intervene to adjust mere discrepancies in teachers' salaries, 
school and other facilities, and the like. In addition, the burgeoning 
disfranchisement movement and the refusal of the courts to block 
that practical nullification of the Fifteenth Amendment meant that 
blacks would be unable to employ the ballot box to put pressure on 
white officials for equal treatment. 
The consequences of Cumming were nowhere more apparent 
than in Augusta, where to accommodate a continuing stream of 
students cheaply, the black elementary schools were put on double 
sessions in 1898, despite which a thousand black children were still 
unable to obtain seats in schools as late as 1910; and where the 
"temporary" suspension of the public high school for blacks was 
continued unti11937. 61 Augusta also witnessed a dramatic collapse 
of the limited political, power blacks had enjoyed since Reconstruc-
tion. A white primary eliminated blacks from municipal politics in 
1899; a murder and lynching led to the absolute segregation of 
streetcars in 1900. The blacks' optimism was gone. As one pre-
viously hopeful black spokesman, Silas Xavier Floyd, commented, 
"Many say that the relations between ihe two races, hitherto so 
pleasant in Augusta, are now strained forever and that the breach 
can never be healed. " 62 Their rights no longer protected, the four 
light-skinned Negroes who had initiated the case responded var-
iously. William J. White never quit protesting but was nearly 
lynched for his part in organizing a statewide movement against a 
disfranchisement law and for his denunciation of the infamous 1906 
Atlanta race riots. James Harper remained in Augusta, continuing 
his business and religious activities and apparently refraining from 
more active dissent, but one of his sons moved to Chicago where he 
later became a militant editor of the influential black newspaper, 
the Daily Defender. John Ladeveze, who according to family tradi-
tion was despondent over the outcome of the case, moved to Los 
""Minutes" (1891-99), 435; "Minutes" (1900), 61; W. E. Burghardt DuBois and 
Augustus G. Dill, eds., The Common School and the Negro American (Atlanta, 1911), 63; 
Range, Rise and Progress of Negro Colleges, 181. It was 1945 before a full four-year public 
high school, which was what Ware had been, was reestablished, according to the annual 
reports of the Georgia State Department of Education. 
•• Augusta Chronicle, November 13, 17, December 7, 1899; May 15-17, 20-21, 25, 1900. 
The Floyd quotation appears in the May21, 1900, issue. The lynching was in stark contrast to 
a similar experience in 1895, when the local militia had been called out to maintain law and 
order, and Joseph Rucker Lamar, a leading local lawyer who later became justice on both the 
Supreme Court of Georgia and of the United States, was appointed special counsel for the 
black accused of murder and defended his penniless client with considerable vigor. 
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Angeles in 1900, passed over the racial barrier, and became a well-
to-do real estate and insurance broker. Joseph W. Cumming stayed 
in Augusta until 1913 or 1914, when he migrated to Philadelphia, 
passed for white, and also sold real estate. 63 When even Justice 
Harlan reneged on the Reconstruction Amendments' promise of 
federal guarantees of black rights, the only safe way to obtain those 
rights was to cease to be a southern Negro . 
., Harper Family Papers; correspondence between Mrs. Emile Veze of Arcadia, Califor-
nia, and author; city directories of Los Angeles, 1900 to 1930, and Philadelphia, 1915 to 
1930. 
